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The Maoist Movement and the Threat to Democracy in Nepal
Stephen L. Mikesell

I sat here in this same forum nine years ago with Com rade Baburam Bhattarai, spokesman of the United People's
Front, the political wing of Nepal's Maoist party. Nepal
had just emerged six months before from a mass Democracy Movement which had succeeded in ending a threedecade old system of absolute monarchal rule and official,
corporate and agency despotism. Through a one-party form
of government called Panchayat Democracy, the monarchy provided the trappings of legitimacy for the country's
foreign donors to underwrite the state and engage in their
project of introducing western forms of property, society,
institutions, interests, commodity forms, aesthetics,
lifestyles, and values. Overall capitalist control was introduced, backed by local educational institutions and police
power.

tesquely put on weight in the intervening months . I remembered how the bodies of demonstrators gunned down by
the military in the final days were left buried and forgotten
under lime and earth in the Royal forest. I heard how the
demands for a constituent assembly, promised three decades ago, were again sidestepped. I also heard how the
writing of the constitution was taken over by a select group
of lawyers guided by conservative legal organizations from
Europe and the United States, which were spending large
amounts of money to ensure that the new democratic constitutions would fit the needs of the New World Order. And
I watched the parties, which claimed themselves to be revolutionary, give over the initiative to these individuals and
interests so their leaders could use their constituencies to
gain seats in parliament.

On the day that we left, we heard that the long awaited
new constitution had just been implemented, giving Nepal
a Westminster-type parliament under a constitutional monarch . In that talk, I said that the settlement that had concluded the Democracy Movement and the drafting of the
new constitution in Nepal represented not the "advent of
democracy," but the concerted demobilization of the population from the political process by an alliance of new
forces. These new forces, to put it bluntly, had been allowed up to the trough of state power by the "victory" of
that movement-"victory" in quotes .'

Baburam Bhattarai agreed with my assessment, though
his party also initially attempted to undertake the struggle
by entering the new parliament in order to disrupt the system from within . But according to Prachandra, the party's
general secretary, this path threatened to conupt the elected
members of their party just as it did everyone else, and it
failed to further the party's revolutionary goals .2 The parliamentary system was opening up the country to international forces of commercialization and further rural impoverishment, not the empowering democracy that had been
promised . For the people in the countryside, the situation
was desperate, and the Maoists saw no other possibility
than revolutionary armed struggle.

I'd observed how the settlement was negotiated by a
small group of political leaders who'd had a marginal role
in the movement and who abandoned all the demands of
the movement except one . In the following weeks, I
watched how the previously underground leaders were
given ministries and feted by embassies and the representatives of international donors and corporations, providing
them a sense of importance that they, rather than the pe.ople
in the streets, had been the moveme nt. I watched them gro1
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So on February 13, 1996, the Maoists launched what
they called a People's War, aimed, in their words, at smashing the capitalist state and establishing a Peoples Democratic Republic. Their aim was to carve out bases in certain
parts of the country from which they could build their organization, create an army of cadres through the practice
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of war, and strengthen and centralize their military to the
point that it could defeat the military capacity of the enemy. That enemy is the government of Nepal and its international supporters.
Their means of building these base areas has been to
attack local representatives of state and class power. These
include police, banks, government offices, foreign aid supported projects, and local representatives of what they see
as the primary exploitative parties, the ruling Congress Party
and the National Democratic Party (RPP). In many parts
of their base districts, the Maoists now claim to have largely
driven out the government officials from the villages and
they are said to be setting up their own parallel government with its own elections and courts. 3 They have dismantled much of the government's machinery in 14 districts, threaten 17 more, and are actively operating in 31
other districts- meaning they have taken the war to 62 of
75 districts of the country with major actions even in the
other districts. Recently they have also started hitting national and international targets. In order to undermine the
confidence of the large multinational corporations that are
helping to underwrite the state, they recently began destroying facilities of multinational corporations such as Unilever
Nepal, Surya Tobacco Company, an Indian Milk company,
liquor factories, Indian school facilities, and Coca Cola.
Recently, for the first time, they also targeted a tourist hotel (although the publicity sensitive tourism industry operators say that it wasn't Maoists). 4
The governments of the RPP and the Nepali Congress
have reacted by calling the Maoists "terrorists", particularly because it is the members of their parties who are
being systematically threatened, attacked and killed around
the country. Several prime ministers have risen and fallen
on the promise of suppressing the Maoists, while the Maoist
movement has all the time expanded and recruited increasing numbers of mostly pliable young people. A power
struggle within the ruling party between KP Bhattarai, the
previous prime minister, and Girija Koirala, the current one,
has kept the ruling party from providing any kind of unitary stance versus the Maoist movement and provided the
Maoists with the room to develop their activities.
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There is no love lost for the police, which ,' trained and
organized on a colonial model, has, for half a century, been
feared and hated by the general populace and regarded as a
tool of the oppressors. The police for their part have become extremely corrupt, particularly as they have been
politicized by subsequent elected governments handing out
their posts as sinecures.5 The rulin g parties and the police
have a vested interest in the continuance and even expansion of the Maoist war, as it provides the rational for expanded budgets, departments, and importance in national
life. They receive unquestioned extravagance and privileges.6 The war also justifies the use of extraordinarily repressive means for parties or individuals to keep themselves
in power.
The police on the ground are poorly trained and
equipped for war against an increasingly well-armed and
growing guerrilla army. There is strong resistance among
their members against posting in "Maoist Affected Areas".
Policemen are being sent to these areas as punishment or
because they lack connections, and even now with financial and other incentives, postings in these areas are leading to high rates of resignation. 7 Once posted in these areas, police men and women find themselves confronted by
a village population that often sympathizes with the Maoist
cause, as the Maoists are bringing positive changes while
the police come just to repress, and see the villagers as
their enemy. And even if the villagers don't have sympathy for or are hostile to the Maoists, the fear of retribution
from the Maoists keeps them from taking any action that
appears to help the police. The police in their turn see the
lack of active support for themselves as tacit support for
the Maoists, putting the villagers between a stone and a
hard place. Consequently police action has led to widespread human rights abuses toward the civilian population,
to say nothing of captured Maoists who are often summarily
executed or otherwise "disappeared". 8 In February the police went so far as to burn hundreds of houses in several
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"PAC seeks helicopter use details from Home Ministry," The
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areas thought to have housed insurgents after a large number of police were killed .9
Such rights abuses have opened the government to criticism from the opposition, the press, and national and international human rights organizations. The Parliament, early
in 1996, passed an Act for the Establishment of a National
Human Rights Commission to deal with human rights violations by police, but subsequent governments resisted the
establishment of such a commission. I assume this is because it would limit the impunity with which the government could ac:t and perhaps because too much of the liability for human rights abuses would extend to them. Under
great pressure, such a commission was only recently established.10 But housed within the secretariat and dependent upon it for its perks, and with political appointees
among its members, editorialists say the commission is a
"toothless tiger"'' -a mere formality to ward off criticism
against the government. The chairman, who is the former
chief justice of the Panchayat regime, created further controversy by saying "that he liked the Panchayat system
better than the present multiparty set-up ."
The failure and political liability of using force increases
calls of negotiations .12 Both the Maoists and the various
governments have said that they will negotiate and negotiating teams were created by both sides, but have never come
together.13 The Maoists set minimal conditions for negotiations: disclosure and whereabouts of people arrested by
the police, release of all those atTested on charges of being
Maoists, and treatment of prisoners according to the Geneva
Convention. 14 However, they will not lay down arms or
give up their long-tetm goal of establishing a proletariat
system of government. 15 The government, on the other
hand, won't talk except within the constitutional frame-
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work, with no compromise of its basic two principles of
multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy. Prime
Minister Koirala fears that successful negotiations would
undercut his position in his party by bringing other people
to the fore . 16 When Bhattarai worked to open negotiations
while he was prime minister, Girija engaged in a tour of
anti-Maoist rallies in which he turned the party against
negotiations and replaced Bhattarai as Prime Minister. As
Prime Minister, he undercut the negotiating team in order
to keep the chairman from gaining acclaim at the expense
of the Koirala family.
Perhaps exposing the real intentions of this series of
governments, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party's Chand in
1996, Surya BahadurThapa in 1998, and Congress's Girija
Koirala in 1999 all introduced strict anti-ten·orist legislation which would suspend the constitutional protections of
the citizens from the police. 17 This legislation includes ar-
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rest without warrant and custody for 3 months without judicial sanction, empowerment of the army, and suspension
of press freedoms. These acts were strongly contested by a
wide range of elements in the society, who warned of an
escalation of arbitrary detention, torture and even extrajudicial killings. It was said th at such an ac t "won't salvage
people from terror but terrorize them ." Amnesty International strongly criticized these efforts, saying that Nepal
should learn a lesson from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh, countries in which such acts led to widespread
human rights abuses and wars without end, both of which
have brought immense suffering to their population. 18
For a long time, the government, particularly of Girija
Koirala, has wanted to mobilize the army. The army has
resisted entry into the war or even providing the police with
automatic weapons, for reasons that I cannot quite comprehend. Although the Maoists anticipate that the ruling
classes will throw the army at them as the war develops,
they have fastidiously avoided confronting the army while
building their base areas. I sense that the army feels that
this is an inter-party and not a national war, and it does not
want to become a tool of one party's suppression of another or of the populace. It has even resisted supplying the
police with more up-to-date weapons. Non-Maoist opposition Communist parties are also strongly opposed to the
use of the army for this reason, and their leaders say that it
would lead the country on the road to a bloody civil war.
Unable to mobilize the army, the Girija government
thus created two divisions within the police under two different Inspector Generals: an armed paramilitary section
to combat the Maoists in the affected areas, and the regular
police in other areas. 19 Recruitment to the paramilitary has
been a problem, since the police see it as a punishment,
regardless of the higher pay and promised promotions.
Policemen say they don't want to go to these regions and
die.
18
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A recent massive attack by 300 Maoist ·guen·illas on
the district headquarters and prison in Dolpa killed and
wounded unprecedented numbers of police and led to the
takeover of the headquarters for a while until the Maoists
withdrew. 20 The army had a large base immediately on the
other side of the river but stood by during the five-hour
long pitched battle. This led the government to criticize
the army for failing to help and provide guns to the police,
which would help to force a consensus among all the parliamentary parties to finally mobilize the army over the
protests of its commanding officersY Given our knowledge of other guerrilla wars, it is likely to be the general
populace which will suffer the wrath of army, with increasing human rights violations and greater polarization of the
country.
Girija also called up the National Security Council
(NCD) allowed by the constitution only in a National Emergency, which would allow him to mobilize the army. There
is also a rumor that he plans to reinstitute the Regional
Commissioners, which would allow him to control the army
and local administrative units from the center. These offices were notorious during the Panchayat era for their lack
of accountability and top-down control from the centralized government, making them into a repressive tool of the
ministries.
Girija is also trying to censor some ten newspapers,
which he sees as supporting the Maoists. The Home Ministry went as far as reframing the role of the press as playing a "crucial role for maintaining law and order in the
society ... it should be playing a responsible role for the
preservation of democracy and peace in the country .... If
the media didn't follow a proper norm, it could have a hazardous effect on the security situation." 22 One could ask
since when was it the norm of the press to align itself with
the government? In democracy, isn't its role to play the
watchdog? Thus, on several counts, the prime minister is
using the Maoist movement as a means of taking away wide
democratic rights.
Objective conditions mitigate against concerted action
against the Maoists. Even the mainstream papers and rulers recognize the terrible inequality in the country, and that

front', " Nepal News
(27 September 2000) http://
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the Maoists are riding on legitimate grievances, even if their
approach is regarded as unconstitutional. As a result, there
is widespread support for the Maoists in the countryside
and great sy mpathy for them in the cities . There is satisfaction in many circles that con·upt officials, who have gone
so long unpunished, are now gettin g their comeuppance.
There is a genera l consensus in the press that the problem
is a political one and that the solution will also be political.
Along with suppression, ministers make visits to the affected areas with promises of big development programs
that will lift the people out of poverty and win the people
back from the Maoists. However, it is this very "development" which has historically strengthened and expanded
the ruling class and its bureaucratic allies and supported
the spread of commercialization, all of which underlie the
Maoist movement and give it soil in which to take root. I
don't see how any government that goes by the old logic of
development will have anything to offer.

Afterward
I have a problem with the title of this paper, Th e Maoist
Movement and the Threat to Democracy. It implies the existence of democracy-as if democracy had been conjured
up in Nepal merely by changing the country's constitution
and allowing multiparty contest for the parliamentary institutions of the state without changing the bureaucratic
machinery. Rather, in fact, the bureaucratic machinery of
the state, of the parties, of international lenders and donors, of multinational banks, and of commercial and industrial interests and institutions has been extended in even
more new and imaginative forms . All this of course, as in
the past, is in the name of the people, particularly the poor.
This conjuration of democracy was made in the context of unprecedented centralization of corporate power on
a planetary level -called "globalization" in educated circles.
(Of course, by its very nature capitalism has always been a
planetary project.) Nepal's democracy movement and,
more specifically, the drafting of the new constitution, did
not occur in isolation, constructed solely out of the country's
own hi story, but emerged as part of a general upsurge of
democracy movements worldwide. These movements in
the Philippines, South Africa, Peru , Chile, Myanmar, Malaysia, China, Nigeria , the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
so on and on-all were let loose by a general undercutting
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of the international legitimacy that had been give.n to the
post-colonial, but st ill very much colonized, regimes . The
settlement and the construction of the new constitutional
framework was paternalistically guided by international
institutions, international money, and international advisors (to be modeled on European parliamentary institutions
as if Nepal had no hi story of its own) . The impl ementation
of the new constitution was fo llowed by the same restructuring, privatization, opening of com modity markets, expropriatio n and dismantling of village communities, appropriation of state and community properties, and implementation of international finance regimes. All of this was
being prescribed across the world as the solution to the
problems brought by the previous 50 years of foreign advisers, foreign aid and grafting of foreign institutions. These
issues render the actual existence of democracy in Nepal
or the idea that it can be threatened, problematic, to say the
least.
It is difficult, reading urban newspapers on the one
hand, and materials published by the Maoists and the International Revolutionary Movement on the other, for me
to ascertain the real effect of the Maoist movement, the
extent of its support in the countryside, and whether it is
really bringing about the goals that it espouses. What I can
say is that the Maoist insurgency is finding a fertile base in
the real grievances of people, especially young people,
which even the mainstream papers and politicians admit,
either in words or actions. Inequality in Nepal is said to be
the worst in South Asia, while the paternalistic institutions
that were once sustained by it but which also mediated and
tempered the exploitation underlying this inequality are
being di smantled in the name of modernization. Fifteen
years ago in my dissertation research, I observed pervasi ve debt as the foundation of the village communities and
of the state. This debt, which provided a means of coercion
of labor but was also tied up with moral obligations of lenders to provide access to the means of production, is now
being used to pry people apart from their means of liveli hood and communities . Traditional institutions, albeit imperfect, are giving away to brutal speculation in land and
people. The tens of thousands of hill women shuffled into
brothels in India and elsewhere in South Asia are emblematic of this just as the toleration of it, and the social stigma
given these women by the ruling classes of the country, are
emblematic of their role more generally.
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